Twelve o'clock high and American Airpower, 1949-1967 by Edwards, SR
1 
 
12 O’Clock High and the Image of American Air Power, 1946-1967 
Sam Edwards, Manchester Metropolitan University 
 
The image was powerful and infamous: Slim Pickens, rodeo performer and star of 
numerous film and television Westerns, straddles a giant H-Bomb and, with Stetson in hand, 
rides it to earth and to doomsday. Here was the essence of Stanley Kubrick’s film Dr. 
Strangelove (1964), a dark satire on the insanity of a world that could produce a doctrine of 
Armageddon and, without irony, reduce it to the acronym “MAD” (Mutually Assured 
Destruction). While provocative, Kubrick’s film was merely the “most notorious chapter in 
this period’s assault on the image of air power.”1 With origins in the era of interwar 
isolationism, and expressed via print media as well as early cinema, this image asserted that 
American air power provided protection, deterred potential aggressors and, if necessary, would 
deliver victory when war came. In the eyes of many strategists, this image was affirmed by the 
events and experiences of World War II, a conflict that saw American air force commanders 
loudly proclaim faith in the bomber’s ability to secure victory through the precise delivery of 
destruction. These were the ideas celebrated in wartime propaganda and, with some subtle 
revisions and refinements, post-war cinema, from Air Force (1943) to A Gathering of Eagles 
(1963). 
By the early 1960s, however, as Cold War tensions increased, this image came under 
increasing criticism—hence Dr. Strangelove. Hence, too, Joseph Heller’s novel Catch-22 
(1961), adapted as a film in 1970, and John Hersey’s The War Lover (1959), released in 
cinemas in 1962. Yet amidst these critiques, one prominent cultural product did seek to sustain 
a defense of American Air Power: the Fox Television/QM Productions series 12 O’Clock High 
(ABC, 1964-67).2 Based upon a novel (1948) and popular feature film (1949) of the same 
name, the television series first aired just eight months after Kubrick released Dr. Strangelove.3 
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Set at an American bomber base in World War II England, and focused on the officers and 
enlisted men of the fictional 918th Bomb Group, 12 O’Clock High was partly inspired by a 
contemporary 1940s nostalgia, seen most clearly in another Fox production, The Longest Day 
(1962); it ran for three seasons on ABC before cancellation in January 1967.  
This chapter examines the origins of the television series, paying close attention to its 
place within the visual culture of American Air Power. I argue that it sought to reclaim and re-
instate an “old” image of Air Power as a means of countering the critiques provided by the 
likes of Kubrick, Heller, and Hersey. However, the chapter also shows that this act of 
reclamation was doomed to fail because the “old” image no longer accommodated the needs 
of the moment. Nineteen sixty-four was not 1949, and the world of the television series was 
not that of the earlier film. Indeed, the image of American Air Power had been long since 
undermined, not just by Slim Pickens, but also by the political and military events that had 
shaped Kubrick’s satirical assault: the Cold War, the war in Korea, and especially the Cuban 
Missile Crisis. The escalating conflict in Vietnam provided a final blow, ensuring that war in 
the azure was seen in a radically different light. Thus, when the first episode of 12 O’Clock 
High aired in September 1964, just one month after the Gulf of Tonkin Incident, its days were 
already numbered.   
World War II and the Visual Culture of American Air Power 
According to historian Michael Sherry, in the aftermath of World War I, and in order 
to demonstrate the significance of military aviation, American Air Power advocates developed 
a revolutionary vision of strategic bombing. Drawing upon ideas then being discussed by 
General Guilio Douhet in Italy and Marshal Hugh Trenchard in Britain, this vision—most 
famously articulated in the United States by General William “Billy” Mitchell—declared that 
Air Power offered the only means through which to secure the territorial integrity of the western 
hemisphere, as it was based upon a military technology, the bomber, which was powerfully 
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destructive, but also attractively progressive and affordable (an important concern during the 
Depression). If war came, Mitchell said, this technology offered the means to deliver an 
organized campaign of bombing designed to cripple an enemy’s industrial infrastructure and 
thus secure strategic victory.4 In American Air Power doctrine, then, the bomber quickly 
accommodated itself to a dynamic and largely unresolved tension: it was a machine of scalpel-
like precision and the delivery vehicle of overwhelming destructive power, the harbinger of 
Armageddon. By the 1940s, this “Jekyll and Hyde” image had emerged as a potent influence 
on popular conceptions of Air Power in the United States.5  
American entry into World War II provided the perfect opportunity for senior air force 
commanders, all of whom were Mitchell disciples, to implement this doctrine. For these so-
called “Bomber Barons”—General Henry “Hap” Arnold, General Ira Eaker, General Carl 
“Tooey” Spaatz, General Jimmy Doolittle—the role of the bomber was to deliver, in daylight, 
precision strikes on the “choke” points of industrial infrastructure. This idea would be most 
clearly realized in the “Schweinfurt Raids” of August-October 1943 during which the Eighth 
Air Force of the United States Army Air Force (USAAF)—the organization responsible for the 
American contribution to the Allied strategic bombing campaign—targeted German ball-
bearing manufacturing plants (because no military machine can run without ball-bearings). In 
later raids, the Eighth Air Force would similarly attack German oil refineries.6  
This concept of Air Power quickly secured a prominent position in American popular 
culture. Indeed, “Hap” Arnold, who commanded the USAAF throughout the war, and Ira 
Eaker, in charge of the Eighth Air Force until January 1944, were both more than happy to 
exploit their contacts among American publishers and press to communicate their visionary 
agenda (Eaker was a graduate in Journalism).7 As a result, even one of the most popular 
novelists of the Depression, John Steinbeck, wrote in support of the Eighth Air Force.8 As the 
war continued, Arnold and Eaker also enlisted help from those involved in a communications 
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technology of the same vintage as military air power: cinema.9 Two of the most successful 
propaganda films of World War II confirm the point: Air Force (1943), directed by aviation 
enthusiast Howard Hawks, and prompted by an idea of General Arnold’s, and The Memphis 
Belle (1944), directed by William Wyler, who was fresh from the success of 1942’s pro-
interventionist Mrs. Miniver. With enthusiastic Air Force support, both films celebrated the 
American bomber, specifically the B-17, the aircraft central to the Allied strategic bombing 
campaign in Europe.  
Following victory in 1945, and after the US Strategic Bombing Survey (commissioned 
by Arnold) fell short of declaring that the Allied air campaign had been decisive, there were 
several further cinematic efforts supportive of strategic bombing. Command Decision (1948), 
directed by Sam Wood, and starring Clark Gable, is a case in point. Based on a play and then 
novel authored by William Wister Haines, the film tells the story of Eighth Air Force General 
Dennis (Gable), and his battle to destroy German jet-manufacturing plants in the face of 
resistance from congressmen concerned by the “cost” in men and machines. As far as Dennis 
is concerned, and with a clear nod to the ideas of Billy Mitchell, strategic bombing provides 
the only means to eradicate the threat posed by these new jet aircraft, and thus win the war and 
save lives. For Gable, this film had personal significance: he had flown five missions as a 
gunner with the Eighth Air Force in order to get material for an Air Force recruitment film 
(Combat America).10   
Similar in style and content, but more powerful in delivery, was Daryl Zanuck and 
Henry King’s 12 O’Clock High (1949). Based upon the novel published a year earlier by Eighth 
Air Force veterans Sy Bartlett and Beirne Lay, Jr., this film provided yet another robust 
representation of the importance of strategic bombing.11 The story centers on General Frank 
Savage, tasked with turning around the performance and morale of the 918th Bomb Group 
(BG), based at an imaginary East Anglian airfield—Archbury. The commanding officer of the 
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918th is suffering from combat exhaustion, a fact demonstrated, says the film, by his increasing 
caution and unwillingness to risk the lives of his men. In contrast, Savage, played by Gregory 
Peck, is a motivated and forceful disciplinarian. He quickly imposes himself on his 
subordinates and converts the 918th from a hard-luck outfit to a hard-hitting one. Throughout, 
the film makes clear that Savage is no cold and calculating killer, but a soldier with a job to do. 
Indeed, just like Gable’s General Dennis, he seeks to save lives through the resolute 
prosecution of the war.  
While audiences warmly received these cinematic visions of World War II Air Power, 
they were predicated nonetheless upon an idea of the bomber’s purpose and potential already 
“old” by 1949. Even the format of 12 O’Clock High asserts this point. The film opens with 
scenes of a derelict American airfield somewhere in the English countryside (scenes partly 
inspired by the opening frames of Anthony Asquith’s 1945 production Way to the Stars). As 
Robert Wohl has noted, this “atmosphere of nostalgia” ensures that “the past is now past and 
can be revisited only in fond memory.”12 Similar nostalgia for old certainties was even more 
apparent in Otto Preminger’s 1955 picture, The Court Martial of Billy Mitchell, which revisited 
Mitchell’s interwar fall from grace due to his strident attachment to the idea of strategic 
bombing. To be sure, the courtroom drama was engaging, but a decade after Hiroshima the 
debate between Mitchell and the Army “Top Brass” over the destructive potential of bombing 
looked rather dated.  
 
Updating the Image of Air Power in the Cold War 
Aware that the earlier image of Air Power had lost its force, General Curtis LeMay—
who became head of the newly created Strategic Air Command (SAC) in the same year 
Command Decision was released—was keen to update it for the nuclear age. For LeMay, an 
Eighth Air Force veteran who earned his reputation directing operations in the Pacific Theater, 
6 
 
the best way to do this was by emphasizing that at the heart of SAC lay the idea of calm 
command and control. SAC, in short, were not the Horsemen of the Apocalypse, but the 
guardians of global peace. Enter the so-called “SAC Trilogy,” a series of films celebrating Air 
Force professionalism and procedures.13  
The first of this trilogy, directed by Anthony Mann, and aptly titled Strategic Air 
Command (1955), was inspired by one of the most powerful actors in postwar Hollywood, a 
man committed by both politics and personal experience to the doctrine of strategic bombing—
Jimmy Stewart. Stewart had flown twenty missions as a wartime officer in the Eighth Air Force 
and, like LeMay, was a personal friend of Beirne Lay, the co-author of both the novel and film 
versions of 12 O’Clock High.14 In conversation with Lay, Stewart suggested the idea for a film 
about a World War II veteran and Air Force Reserve Officer recalled to active duty in order to 
help SAC meet the ever-growing demands on its manpower and mission. What followed was 
a screenplay along just these lines. Stewart plays Dutch Holland, World War II bomber pilot 
and baseball legend. Set six years after the war’s end, we see Dutch recalled to service by a 
wartime buddy in need of “mature” leaders to help fulfil SAC’s mission. Dutch is reluctant; he 
is recently married and enjoying life as a peacetime ball-player. But duty calls, and he returns 
to uniform. Of special interest is the way General Hawkes (clearly modelled on LeMay) wins 
Dutch over to military service. With very little subtlety, the General tells anyone who will listen 
why SAC exists: “we’re here,” he informs Stewart, to “to stop a war from starting.” The other 
two constituents of the “SAC Trilogy”—Bombers B-52 (1957), directed by Gordon Douglas, 
and A Gathering of Eagles (1963), directed by Delbet Mann—address similar themes, and all 
three pictures involved either one or more of the Bartlett/Lay 12 O’Clock High team.  
However, although intended to revise the image of Air Power for the nuclear age, even 
the SAC Trilogy became dated as real world events altered the context in which Americans 
understood the role and rationale of the bomber. From the Soviet testing of an atom bomb in 
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1949, to the fears of nuclear escalation that accompanied the Korean War, contemporary events 
threatened to expose the bomber for what it really was—a destroyer.15 And then came two 
incidents that threatened to undermine the very role and reputation of SAC. First, the Gary 
Powers controversy of May 1960 (when the Soviet Union shot down a CIA spy plane) raised 
serious questions about whether or not, in the event of hostilities, SAC aircraft would actually 
be able to penetrate Soviet air space. Second, the Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 
produced significant public concern about the threat of nuclear holocaust, and about the 
controls in place to ensure the world could not be annihilated by accident or error. Within the 
context of these two incidents, the image of Air Power became the subject of a profound 
challenge. 
Take, for instance, Philip Leacock’s 1962 picture The War Lover, which depicts the B-
17 as the weapon of choice for a psychotic bomber pilot—played in the film with charisma and 
menace by Steve McQueen—who loved war so much that it provided a sexual thrill. For this 
pilot, and in a perverse twist on the logic of General Frank Savage, bombing is a “job,” but one 
which he likes (in one scene he whoops with joy after being given the reconnaissance 
photographs recording his most recent “work”). John Hersey, of course, was already famous 
by this point for revealing the horrors of atomic destruction in Hiroshima (1945). Elsewhere, 
Joseph Heller’s novel Catch-22, published a year before The War Lover, offered a biting satire 
on war and the various degrees of madness that it promotes, demands, and sustains. As such, it 
provided a diametrically opposed image of Air Power to that prevalent in post-war cinema. As 
Steve Call succinctly explains: “[i]f The War Lover is a photographic negative of 12 O’Clock 
High, Catch-22 is its demented nightmare version.”16  
The most celebrated critique of Air Power in this era was Kubrick’s Dr Strangelove. 
Instead of LeMay-inspired General Castle chomping on his cigars as he delivers yet another 
pronouncement on the absolute necessity of SAC, we have (with a rather different hint of 
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LeMay influence) General Buck Turgidson (George C. Scott) and General Jack Ripper 
(Sterling Hayden). The former is philistine, delusional and occasionally manic when 
contemplating the destructive power of the B-52, one of which has “gone rogue” and is headed 
for Russia to deliver the “bomb.” The latter dispatches said bomber (and several others) after 
being consumed by the paranoid obsession that communist infiltrators have “polluted his 
bodily essence.” We are a long way here from the idea of calm command and control that 
dominates Strategic Air Command and A Gathering of Eagles.  
Such, then, was the image of Air Power offered in visual culture by the early 1960s. 
From the propaganda platitudes of Air Force to the blunt politics and patriotism of the SAC 
Trilogy, advocates of American Air Power used visual culture as a means to secure popular 
support for their mission. However, the sharp and satirical critiques of Hersey, Heller, and 
Kubrick, as well as the Cold War tensions of the moment, dealt their efforts a powerful blow 
by the sharp and satirical critiques of Hersey, Heller, and Kubrick, as well as by the Cold War 
tensions of the moment. Combined, these “real” and “reel” events ensured that by the early 
1960s, and on the “eve of America’s most controversial war [Vietnam], air power had 
experienced a rapid fall from grace in the eyes of the American public.”17    
 
12 O’Clock High and the Resurrection of Air Power  
Steve Call concludes his insightful examination of the ways in which Air Power has 
been sold to the American public with this “fall from grace.” In cinematic terms, such a 
conclusion seems apt. Yet to conclude here also neglects an important development in the 
audio-visual canon of Air Power. For if American cinema largely abandoned the doctrine of 
strategic bombing in the aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis and Dr Strangelove, one 
American television series embraced it. The series was 12 O’Clock High. 
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The origins of the series have been well discussed by Alan Duffin and Paul Matheis in 
their exhaustive study of the various incarnations of 12 O’Clock High.18 As they explain, by 
1951, movie theaters were closing as the sale of television sets soared—ticket sales were down, 
audiences had declined, and profits had fallen. In an attempt to respond to this challenge movie 
studies tried new and expensive experiments, such as expanding the use of color film and 
developing better quality picture formats. At the forefront of these experiments was Twentieth-
Century Fox, among the studios worst hit by the declining fortunes of the movie industry. 
Indeed, Fox was struggling to respond not just to the changed dynamics of the moment, but 
also to some of their own poor decisions. For instance, after selling much of their Hollywood 
real estate in order to raise capital, they then plowed the new funds into a picture that quickly 
became a byword for excess, waste, and box office failure: Cleopatra (1962). Equally 
important, their founder and talisman, Daryl F. Zanuck, who had built a career on his intuitive 
ability to deliver what audiences wanted to see, had left the studio in 1956 amid rancour and 
recriminations. Without him, Fox lost three decades of sharp and savvy decision-making and 
story-telling expertise.19 
 In 1960, Zanuck returned from his self-imposed exile in France, appointed his son 
Richard as president of Fox Television, and, with The Longest Day (1962), quickly reasserted 
his ability to identify the zeitgeist.20 The film cost just $7.75 million to make (as opposed to 
the $42 million price tag of Cleopatra) and was a commercial and critical success.21 Two years 
later, the considerable media attention surrounding the twentieth anniversary of the D-Day 
landings confirmed Zanuck’s skillful reading of the moment.22  
But saving the company required more than just one successful picture, and so under 
Zanuck’s leadership Fox also invested greater resources in the new medium of television.23 
Following the success of The Longest Day, and no doubt inspired by Zanuck’s long-running 
interest in the Air Force (he was a Charter member of the Air Power League and had been 
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personally involved in shaping the 1949 film), company executives began searching for 
suitable World War II-themed stories among their existing copyright properties. They turned 
to 12 O’Clock High, a story which also offered the opportunity, two years after the Cuban 
Missile Crisis, to recreate a positive image of Air Power by setting the story in World War II 
Europe. In this historical context, characters would be able to voice the logic and rationale of 
strategic bombing without invoking Hiroshima, Nagasaki, or the threat of Armageddon. The 
Department of Defense was approached for support and technical advice, which was soon 
forthcoming (the DoD remained involved for the duration of the series and had right of 
approval on the scripts).24 
The idea for the series’ structure came from Quinn Martin, recently the producer of The 
Untouchables, (ABC, 1959-63) and later a key figure in such productions as The FBI (ABC, 
1965-74) and Green Hornet (ABC, 1966-67). Quinn, who had served in the Signal Corps 
throughout the war, formed his own production company—QM Productions—in 1960. With 
input from writer Paul Monash and 12 O’Clock High author Beirne Lay, Quinn crafted the idea 
for a series based on “stories of men during war, not always men at war.”25 In the lead role of 
General Frank Savage, Quinn cast the Broadway trained Robert Lansing. Just a year earlier 
Lansing had a minor role in the concluding picture in the SAC Trilogy—A Gathering of Eagles. 
Solidifying these links to the SAC trilogy, Master Sergeant James Doherty, who served as 
technical advisor on Bombers B-52, fulfilled the same role on 12 O’Clock High.26 Meanwhile, 
to support Lansing, Quinn cast John Larkin in the role of Major General Wiley Crow (Savage’s 
immediate superior and friend), and Robert Overton as Major Harvey Stovall, his Executive 
Officer (the only character to last all three seasons). In terms of the aesthetic, the series was 
filmed in black and white, which allowed for the frequent display of original wartime footage 
of American bombers in action (much of this footage was taken from wartime documentaries, 
or from post-war films such as Command Decision).27 
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Season one explored the narrative possibilities suggested by Monash and Lay. The 
thirty-three episodes feature stories in which Savage finds love and romance; stories of capture 
and captivity; stories of resistance, betrayal, and collaboration. Notably, women often feature 
as either domestic distractions or subversive threats. As in the SAC Trilogy, they are the 
representatives of peace and domesticity who provide the cause and justification for the male 
work of war, and, when necessary, offer moments of rest, relaxation, and recovery. For 
instance, in Episode 10 (tellingly titled “Interlude”) Savage, exhausted by combat, is ordered 
on leave. He takes the train to the “end of the line” (Scotland) and duly falls in love with his 
carriage counterpart, Anne Macrae, played by Dana Wynter, reprising something of the role 
she played opposite Robert Taylor in D-Day: The Sixth of June (1956). But the potential threat 
that this “interlude” might permanently interrupt Savage’s work is disarmed by a cunning plot 
device: Macrae is only on the train because she is heading home to die (she has terminal 
carcinoma). Thus, Savage gets to have his cake and eat it, too. He loves, learns (to cry and feel 
again), loses, and then returns to war, the better man (and warrior) for being reminded why, 
and for whom, he fights: he fights for peace, picnics, and posies (shortly before Macrae dies, 
she reveals to Savage her legacy—a flower bed, sown in her garden).28 Elsewhere, women are 
depicted according to the other pole of the classic Virgin/Whore dichotomy; that is, they are 
the cynical, immoral (or amoral) sexual temptresses who threaten to undermine the business of 
bombing. In Episode 8 (“The Hours Before Dawn”) Savage is confronted by an English lady 
so devoid of moral scruples that she declares “neutrality” and refuses to aid his escape after 
they are both imprisoned by a downed Luftwaffe bomber pilot. In Episode 12 (“Soldiers 
Sometimes Kill”) Savage is even drugged and duped by a woman acting on behalf of an English 
Nazi fifth-columnist.29  
Nevertheless, amid these various stories of love and loss, domesticity and deceit, season 
one frequently revisits the theme central to the original novel and the 1949 film: the necessity 
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and utility of Air Power. In particular, episodes repeatedly rehearse the reasons why the 918th 
BG are in England and the details of how they do their job. It is here that we see most clearly 
the attempt to hit the rhetorical rewind button and revive the purpose and rationale of American 
Air Power. 
Episode 6 well demonstrates the point. Titled “Pressure Point” it follows the attempts 
of General Savage to win over an anti-bombing politician undertaking an inspection of 
American airfields in England (a plot that was essentially derivative of Command Decision). 
The politician in question, Senator Clayton Johnson (Larry Gates), already distrusts Savage 
due to a past connection (fifteen years earlier Savage had wanted to marry Clayton’s daughter, 
but the Senator broke the engagement due to his dislike of military aviators). These feelings 
are intensified by Clayton’s belief that strategic bombing is ineffective and overly costly in 
terms of American lives. Ultimately, however, Savage converts the Senator to the war-winning 
effectiveness of his bomber force by delivering a mission in which the target is completely 
destroyed, without the loss of a single American plane.30  
Even when the doctrine of Air Power is not foregrounded, it is often in the background 
or between the lines. In Episode 7 (“Decision”) for instance, the precision of the B-17 is 
powerfully demonstrated by the fact that it is able to hit a factory building immediately adjacent 
to the “cage” in which a group of American POWs have been imprisoned by their German 
captors so that they might serve as a human shield.31 On other occasions, the value of strategic 
bombing is asserted in the face of the very moral and ethical qualms so central to the attacks 
levelled in the likes of The War Lover and Dr. Strangelove. Thus, in Episode 2 (“Follow the 
Leader”), Lt. Mellon, the lead bombardier in the 918th BG, is traumatized by the fact that he is 
responsible for the accidental destruction of a Dutch school. But after discovering that the error 
was due to mechanical failure rather than human oversight, General Savage orders him on the 
next mission. Mellon goes, overcomes his moral uncertainties, and drops his bombs. They fall 
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right on target, and there is no suggestion of civilian death. Similarly, in Episode 4 (“The Sound 
of Distant Thunder”), another bombardier, Lt. Lathrop (Peter Fonda), a quiet tee-totalling mid-
westerner, loses his faith in bombing after his English girlfriend is killed during a German raid 
on London. Having experienced what it is like on the receiving end, Lathrop declares to Savage 
that he cannot go on. With words directly inspired by the rhetoric of the wartime bomber 
barons, Savage counters that in the long run bombing will actually shorten the war and thus 
save lives. Lathrop listens, learns, and is ready the next day for the mission. Later, in Episode 
19, (“Faith, Hope and Sergeant Aronson”) the idea that the doctrine of strategic bombing is a 
sort of “faith” is affirmed by a story in which an airman of deep religious conviction loses his 
way following the death of his best friend. He returns to the true path only when required to be 
a blood donor for a wounded General Savage, and only after finding love with a local English 
girl. With his “heart” restored (much like the wounded Savage, after a complicated operation 
to remove a piece of shrapnel lodged in his chest), Aronson (Sorrell Booke) returns to battle. 
Indeed, the closing scene actually suggests that he returns to do “God’s work.” Here strategic 
bombing is divine retribution, and American bombers merely the tools through which God 
smites the unrighteous. Little wonder that in Episode 11 (“Here’s to Courageous Cowards”) 
even a former conscientious objector is won over to the rightness of the cause.32 
Such was the skill and subtlety of the first season. It does not shy away from the moral 
and ethical uncertainties of bomber crews, nor does it ignore the fact of “collateral damage.” 
Furthermore, unlike its cinematic forebears, the first season of 12 O’Clock High is not blunt 
with its politics. Rather, it veils its ideological commitment to the bomber through stories that 
ostensibly explore “other” issues—love, trauma, Anglo-American relations. Yet the resolutions 
to these stories quietly assert that strategic bombing is right, proper, and effective. Love might 
be lost, but at least the war will be won; civilians might, very occasionally, be killed, but only 
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by accident or mistake; moral uncertainties are raised, but only to ensure they can be confronted 
and silenced.  
Throughout, the audience is encouraged to view events—their reason and rationale—
from the perspective of wholesome farm-boys, mature and sensitive representatives of the 
American melting-pot (Episode 19’s Sgt. Aronson is a scholarly and devout Jewish-American), 
or knowledgeable commanders. General Savage is the lynchpin of the whole series, and his 
very name is indicative of the rationale that structures the show. “Savage” is suggestive of the 
potential for primitive violence and brutality, and, in the novel, we are told that the character 
is of partly “Indian blood.”33 Yet as the novel, film, and television series all assert, General 
Savage is no mere barbarian. Like James Fenimore-Cooper’s Hawkeye, his capacity for 
violence, his “Indian” ancestry, his inner Hyde, is always controlled, to be unleashed only when 
time and circumstance demands.  
The public and critical response to the series was mixed. Some critics, like those in the 
New York Times, Time, and Newsweek, thought Robert Lansing’s General Savage was powerful 
and engaging. Others were less impressed, finding the performances wooden, the plots facile 
and overly simple in their conclusions, and the possible scenarios provided by the focus and 
format far too restrictive.34 Perhaps these critics had a point, for the ratings certainly proved 
disappointing. After securing an impressive Arbitron rating of 23.3 for its first episode (which 
equated to 50.9% share, or over half of US households with the television on at that hour), in 
subsequent weeks the show settled at a rather more lowly rating of 12.35 Part of the problem 
was that the network screening the show—ABC—seemed uncertain about exactly where to 
place it in their schedules. It first screened at 9:30 pm on Friday evenings but moved to 10 pm 
halfway through the series. Moreover, after deciding to commission a second season, ABC 
moved the series again, this time to the earlier slot of 7:30 pm and on Mondays.36 The network 
also made a key demand: that General Savage would have to go.37 
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One of the series’ screenwriters, Harold Bloom, recalls that central to ABC’s demand 
was their concern that, in the hands of Lansing, General Savage looked like a “brooding 
villain.”38 Indeed, in his eyes, furrowed brow, and the intensity of his performance, there is 
something reminiscent of Steve McQueen’s psychotic bomber pilot from The War Lover. In 
concert with this “problem,” ABC also suggested that the show was too focused on the views 
and opinions of commanders, rather than on the experiences of the young men flying the planes 
(who it was assumed would be more engaging for the younger, 7:30 pm, audience).39 After 
Generals Turgidson and Ripper, moreover, and with the outspoken LeMay now Chief of the 
Air Staff (in 1965, LeMay would famously declare that he thought North Vietnam should be 
bombed back to the “stone age”), it was now increasingly difficult to see the commanders of 
Air Power as unequivocally “good.”  
 Thus, despite being intended to re-establish the image of strategic bombing, the 
decision to focus much of the story-telling on General Savage actually threatened to do the 
opposite. This was especially the case because the director of photography, keen to ensure the 
show had an authentic, gritty quality, consciously chose—like Kubrick—to invoke a film noir 
style. Shadow, contrasts of light and dark, and grainy combat footage were all employed to 
assert the seriousness of the subject matter.40 As a result, Lansing’s brooding was accentuated 
by a brooding set, and the result was dark both aesthetically and in tone. So Lansing was 
dismissed, and his character, the central figure in the 1948 novel and the clear focus of the 1949 
film, was killed in the opening episode of season two (“The Loneliest Place in the World”). 
Significantly, Lansing refused to appear on set simply to receive the coup de grace, and so his 
exit was achieved by a “clean,” if less than subtle, sequence: Savage’s plane is hit during a 
bombing mission and falls from the sky. Back at Archbury, a message from the French 
Resistance confirms his death, and his picture and name are duly removed from the Group’s 
command roster.41  
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Following the abrupt departure of General Savage, season two is different in feel and 
form, particularly because the other key character who articulated the views of the World War 
II Bomber Barons—General Crowe—had similarly exited stage left (John Larkin, who played 
Crowe, sadly died in early 1965 following a heart attack). With Savage and Crowe gone, the 
differences between season one and two were apparent right from the start, and emphasised in 
the new lead: Paul Burke, as Colonel Joe Gallagher. Gallagher had previously featured in the 
opening episode of season one as something of an ill-disciplined flyboy. In season two, 
however, he emerges as a mature and seasoned commander. To be sure, he occasionally lacks 
Savage’s clarity and conviction, but, in many respects, Gallagher is a more sympathetic and 
human character. He makes mistakes; he gets drunk; he pursues women with gusto, yet he 
maintains his moral compass and makes the tough decisions. However, by replacing the 
character of General Savage with that of Colonel Gallagher, and by giving the role of support 
to Sergeant Komansky, played by Chris Robinson (as opposed to General Crowe), the 
decisions Gallagher has to make are of a different sort and order. Whereas Savage and Crowe 
debated the merits of the overall strategic bombing campaign, Gallagher and Komansky foil 
saboteurs, perform heroics, and argue over women. Consequently, there is much in season two 
intended for a younger audience—more sky-fighting, excitement, and romance. In order to 
suggest chronological progression, the series also shifts the action to a different point in the 
war. While season one placed the drama in 1943, a time when the commanders of the USAAF 
were still making the case for daylight bombing, season two moves the focus to the months 
leading up to D-Day (another clear nod towards the recent success of The Longest Day, and 
also suggestive of the impact of the twentieth anniversary D-Day commemorations, which 
included a popular CBS documentary featuring Dwight Eisenhower wandering the beaches of 
Normandy with Walter Cronkite).42  
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If the dynamics of the show were altered by the re-introduction of matinee idol Paul 
Burke, and by the comradeship (and tension) between his character and that of Sgt. Komansky, 
the show’s writers nonetheless remained committed to providing a positive image of Air 
Power. In Episode 19 (“Which Way the Wind Blows”) for instance, Gallagher, finds a way of 
delivering precision attacks even in overcast weather, an idea refined further in Episode 21 
(“Back to the Drawing Board”) following the development of a new specialist piece of 
equipment, the “Bomb Through Overcast” device. In Episode 22 (“25th Mission”), the writers 
even reuse, once again, a plot device from Command Decision, albeit with a slight twist: 
Gallagher must lead his group on a mission to destroy a jet fighter manufacturing plant, but he 
must do so at night. Thus, even darkness cannot deny the precision of the B-17. A similar 
homage to the past was also apparent in Episode 24 (“Angel Babe”), clearly inspired by The 
Memphis Belle.43 
In addition to episodes that continued to assert the value of Air Power, season two also 
included some striking attempts to disarm the powerful critiques delivered by the likes of 
Kubrick, Heller, and Hersey. In Episode 7 (“Show Me a Hero, I’ll Show You a Bum”), for 
example, we see Sgt. Komansky kick loose a bomb that becomes stuck in the bomb bay during 
a mission, but there is pointedly no rodeo ride to doomsday. Episode 9 (“I Am the Enemy”), 
meanwhile, focuses on an officer very similar in motivation and purpose to Steve McQueen’s 
war-loving pilot from The War Lover. However, rather than being revealed as a home-grown 
American psycho, this pilot—Major Kurt Brown, played by a pre-Star Trek William Shatner—
turns out to be of German ancestry. His desire to kill German civilians is thus translated into a 
death wish, rather than being indicative of the real purpose (and result) of strategic bombing. 
In Episode 13 (“The Jones Boys”) the story pivots on war profiteers and features an American 
airman selling government equipment for personal profit. In contrast to Heller’s Milo 
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Minderbinder, this is not to be understood as the underlying rationale of war revealed. Rather, 
to pursue profit is commensurate with duty denied and morals corrupted.44 
Despite these changes, the response of viewers remained mixed. Notably, some of the 
“old” fans disliked the new format and complained that, in making the show more attractive to 
a younger audience, it had lost much of its character depth and gritty realism.45 There were 
problems, too, in the form of tensions between the two leads, Burke and Robinson, the latter 
of whom occasionally scene stole from the former. Then there were the ratings, which remained 
poor, generally hovering somewhere around 11.5 to 15.2 according to Arbitron (a 24 to 27 
share). As a result, when surveyed in September 1965, 12 O’Clock High was found to be only 
the twenty-sixth most popular show on the schedules. By November 1965, it was out of the top 
forty.46 
Despite a new lead, impressive production values ($130,000 per episode by season 
two), and a shift in the schedules, 12 O’Clock High was still struggling to live up to 
expectations. Even a concerted and costly publicity campaign had failed to build the necessary 
anticipation. Nonetheless, in March 1966 Quinn Martin received news that the show would be 
renewed for a third season, but on a new condition—that it be produced in full color.47 Not all 
were convinced that this was the way to go. The film noir-inspired director of photography, 
William Spencer, remarked that “World War II was in black-and-white. It’s hard to make color 
look down and dirty and grim.”48 Filming the show in color also presented practical problems. 
Most of the wartime footage of bombers flying and fighting was in black-and-white, and this 
made splicing difficult if not impossible. However, ABC insisted, and QM Productions finally 
agreed.  
Thus, season three certainly looks different to seasons one and two. In full technicolor, 
the show no longer suggested the gritty quality of authenticity that had characterized earlier 
episodes. Still, action-adventure remained a key focus, and there was more love, loss, and 
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romance, as well as references to contemporary transatlantic relations and Cold War concerns 
(more than one episode features Russian characters). During planning, the producers also opted 
to keep the chronology in and around 1944 so that D-Day could again be in the background. 
Despite the technical challenge, even the familiar imagery of World War II air combat 
remained present, as The Memphis Belle provided plenty of suitable color footage. As if to 
assert the extent to which the show remained in tune with its roots, ABC also returned it to its 
original timeslot of 10 pm on Fridays.49  
 
Cancellation and Conclusion 
In spite of these initiatives, 12 O’Clock High continued to struggle in the ratings, and 
across a two week period in October 1966 it was recorded as the ninety-first most popular show 
(out of ninety-two).50 Consequently, a month later, ABC announced they were dropping the 
show; season three ended in January 1967 after just seventeen episodes.51 At the time, several 
factors were identified as responsible for the show’s poor overall performance. It was, to be 
sure, competing against many other shows, not the least of which was Combat! (see Chapter 2 
in this volume). Another factor concerned the relatively high production values, a cost which 
obviously had to be recouped. Perhaps, too, as some critics suggested, the scenario was overly 
restrictive; a World War II airfield might work well as the focus for a film, but less so for a TV 
series offering thirty-three episodes per season. Eventually, the choice of plot lines would 
expire (a point apparent in season three, which saw some episodes revisiting plots from season 
one). 
All of these are certainly explanatory factors in the collapse and cancellation of 12 
O’Clock High, but the contemporary political and cultural context was the crucial factor. By 
1967, the doctrine of Air Power had seen too many challenges and critiques, too many 
questions asked and fears expressed, as American “victory culture” commenced its terminal 
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decline.52 Who, now, could see a bomb kicked out of a plane without thinking of Slim Pickens? 
Who, after Buck Turgidson, could see in an Air Power General a calm and clear commander? 
Who, after Strangelove, not to mention Hiroshima, could see in the strategic bomber anything 
other than the Destroyer of Worlds? Moreover, the answer to the last question provided yet 
more problems, for the people who did still have faith in the bomber were those at that very 
moment seeking to apply its power in Vietnam. Operation Rolling Thunder, the American air 
campaign against North Vietnam, officially began in March 1965, just as 12 O’Clock High was 
half way through its first season. The campaign remained on-going until 1968 and thus 
provided the real-world Air Power backdrop to the televisual theatrics of Quinn Martin’s 
production. Significantly, the Air Force officers who planned Rolling Thunder remained, like 
General Savage, fully committed to the doctrine of strategic bombing. As historian Mark 
Clodfelter has explained, in adherence to what had become the “dogma” of this doctrine, 
Vietnam-era air leaders “insisted that future attacks directed against a nation’s capability to 
fight would weaken its will to resist.”53 Such was the logic, and the ultimate flaw, governing 
Rolling Thunder. As a concept, strategic bombing assumes that the enemy must have vital 
centers to attack, and the destruction of such targets will, in turn, affect the ability to make war. 
Neither of these represented accurate assessments of the nature of the North Vietnamese 
economy, or of the dynamics of the indigenous Viet Cong guerrilla movement. In short, a 
World War II-era vision of strategic bombing was simply wrong for Vietnam and wrong for 
the 1960s.54  
Here was the ultimate reason for the end of 12 O’Clock High. As both novel and film, 
it had been successful because its vision of Air Power met the demands of the moment. By 
1964, this vision had foundered. Korea, the Cuban Missile Crisis, the satirical and political 
attacks of Kubrick, Heller, and Hersey, all had compromised the “old” idea of Air Power. And 
then came Vietnam, a conflict in which this old idea was applied to South-East Asia, with little 
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success. Furthermore, the extent to which the show and the doctrine were in symbiotic 
relationship was institutionalised through the advice and support provided to QM Productions 
by both the Department of Defense and the Air Force (the latter even included images from the 
show in recruitment posters).55 Thus, as the 1960s progressed 12 O’Clock High, just like the 
actual application of Air Power in Vietnam, stuttered and struggled, before stalling and 
crashing. Little wonder that the show’s producer, Bill Gordon, later remarked: “there was no 
question about it. The anti-Vietnam protests and general anti-war sentiment worked against 12 
O’Clock High rating-wise, and perhaps the cliché of World War II.”56 Even the one storyline 
that might have provided a route through the impasse—celebrations of the wartime 
transatlantic alliance—was nullified by contemporary disputes and disagreements. Britain 
persistently refused to contribute troops to the fighting in South-East Asia while President 
Charles de Gaulle would declare in June 1965 that the “United States was the greatest danger 
in the world today to peace.”57 A year later, De Gaulle withdrew the French military from 
NATO and then demanded the removal of all US troops from French soil. What chance now 
for stories lingering on the closeness of the Grand Alliance or eulogising the Anglo-American 
“ties that bind”? And so ABC’s 12 O’Clock High, a TV series born of a nostalgic return to the 
imagined certainties of World War II and intimately connected to a thirty year effort to 
celebrate American Air Power, found that it had no place or purpose amid the changes, 
challenges, and confusions of the late 1960s.   
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